Sukuk, tahvilin İslami versiyonu değildir; farklı bir risk dağılımıdır. Hangi projeler için mülkiyet yapısı avantaj, hangileri için yüktür? Konya şehir hastanesi örneğiyle.

Bu yazı İngilizce yayımlanmıştır.

The Wrong Question

Consider a finance ministry in Ankara, Cairo or Tashkent that must fund a toll road. Two instruments sit on the table: a conventional eurobond and a sukuk. Most commentary treats the choice as one of investor optics, the same debt in different dress. The market’s own vocabulary encourages the error. Sukuk are routinely called ‘Islamic bonds’, priced against bond curves and placed by the same syndicate desks. Global issuance reached a record US$264.8 billion in 2025 and is expected to rise to between US$270 billion and US$280 billion in 2026. These are the figures of an instrument that conventional capital markets have thoroughly domesticated. The resemblance is misleading in precisely the cases that matter most.

A sukuk is not a promise to repay money. It is a certificate of undivided ownership in an asset, a usufruct or a venture. That difference is inert for a well-rated sovereign refinancing its general budget. It becomes decisive when the asset is a power plant that does not yet exist, an airport whose revenues will be shared with a concessionaire, or a borrower who may one day need to restructure. The question worth asking is therefore not whether sukuk are compliant, nor whether they are cheaper. It is for which projects the ownership structure is an advantage, and for which it is a liability.

That is a question of fit, not of doctrine. Nothing in what follows challenges the authority of the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), or the critique of the sukuk market advanced by Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani. Where this piece describes the market’s compromises, it describes them; it does not defend them. Its concern throughout is the fit between structure and project, not the doctrinal validity of the standards that govern the structure.

What a Sukuk Legally Is

The doctrinal core is easily stated. Shari’ah does not permit a debt to be sold for anything other than its face value, so a tradable Islamic security cannot be a pure receivable; it must represent a share in something real. The issuer therefore transfers an asset, or the right to its use, to a special purpose vehicle (SPV). The SPV issues certificates to investors and passes the asset’s income on to them as periodic distributions. AAOIFI’s Shari’ah Standard No 17 recognises fourteen such structures. Two dominate infrastructure finance.

The first is ijara. The SPV acquires an existing asset from the sponsor and leases it back. The rental stream funds the periodic distributions, and a purchase undertaking at maturity returns the asset to the sponsor. The second is the istisna–ijara hybrid, in which the SPV commissions the asset’s construction under an istisna contract and, on completion, leases it under a forward ijara. A single certificate then spans both the construction and the operating phase. Two consequences follow, and the remainder of this piece turns on them. First, the SPV, the asset transfer and the lease are genuine contracts with genuine effects under their governing law, not a religious gloss on a bond. A lawyer reads them, and a court enforces them, as such. Second, because the certificate is tied to a specific asset, the instrument’s strengths and weaknesses are the strengths and weaknesses of that asset, to the extent that the investor’s claim on the asset is real. Section IV shows how often, in practice, it is not.

Where Sukuk Wins

The ownership requirement, so often treated as a constraint, is in the infrastructure context a natural fit. A toll road, a hospital campus or a container terminal is exactly what Standard No 17 asks for: a tangible, revenue-generating asset with a long economic life, whose income can be passed on to certificate-holders as rent. The World Bank’s own reading is that the asset-backed, ring-fenced and project-specific character of Islamic structures, together with their emphasis on risk-sharing, makes them a natural match for infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs). Conventional project bonds strain to achieve through covenants what an ijara achieves by construction: an investor whose claim is tied to a specific asset and its cash flows. The second advantage is the investor base. Islamic banks, takaful operators and Shari’ah-compliant funds, many of them in the Gulf, cannot by mandate hold conventional paper. A sukuk therefore opens a pool of capital that a eurobond cannot reach. For a sovereign or sponsor whose conventional curve is thin, this is not a cosmetic benefit. Egypt, which debuted in the sukuk market only in 2023, issued US$2.5 billion of sukuk in 2025, and S&P expects further new issuers to follow in 2026 to diversify their investor bases. The same logic drives Gulf issuers themselves. Fitch attributes the sustained momentum of 2026 to funding-diversification strategies among GCC states and to refinancing needs.

The third advantage is institutional. The Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group provides a form of anchoring with no exact conventional counterpart. The IsDB co-finances; its insurer, the Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit (ICIEC), covers political and credit risk; and both lend Shari’ah credibility that lowers the structuring burden on a first-time issuer. The published PPP case studies, from Doraleh in Djibouti to Queen Alia in Jordan and Konya in Türkiye, share this feature: a multilateral Islamic anchor around which private and conventional capital could be arranged.

A final advantage is less often stated. Because the structure must identify and transfer an asset, it disciplines the sponsor. A project vague enough to be funded on the general credit of the issuer will struggle to be funded by sukuk. That friction is a cost for the issuer. For the investor, and for the public, it is a feature: it pushes towards properly delineated projects with identifiable revenues.

Where Sukuk Loses

The same feature that makes sukuk suitable for a hospital already built makes them awkward for one not yet begun. A greenfield project has no asset to lease, so the structure must reach for istisna: the certificate-holders commission the construction and take, in some measure, its risk. The forward ijara that follows depends on the asset arriving on time and to specification. Conventional project bonds carry construction risk too, but they do so through familiar covenants and completion guarantees. The istisna–ijara hybrid layers a second set of contractual and Shari’ah questions on top, and each layer adds a fee, a scholar’s opinion and a point of potential dispute. There is also the cost of carry: a sukuk raises its whole proceeds at closing and begins paying distributions on them at once, while a greenfield project draws funds down over years.

The deeper weakness is that much of the market rests on a compromise. Describing that compromise, as this section does, is not defending it.

In 2008, prompted by Usmani’s critique, the AAOIFI Shari’ah Board found that many sukuk in issue had drifted from the standard. Purchase undertakings at face value in musharakah and mudarabah structures guaranteed the return of principal, and thereby turned equity-like instruments into debt-like ones. The market’s response was not to abandon the compromise but to formalise it. Most sukuk today are asset-based rather than asset-backed: investors hold a beneficial interest in the asset, not legal title, and in insolvency their recourse is to the obligor rather than to the asset. That distinction is the analytical hinge of this piece, and it is the same distinction on which AAOIFI’s proposed revision of Shari’ah Standard No 62 turns. The argument here works with that standard, not around it.

Its consequence deserves to be stated plainly. The ‘ownership’ that distinguishes sukuk from bonds is, in the ordinary case, a matter of form. The holder of an asset-based sukuk receives a fixed periodic distribution, is repaid at par through the obligor’s purchase undertaking, and on default looks to the obligor’s credit rather than to the asset. The asset shapes the documentation; it does not shape the economics. Everything that follows, from the Dana Gas litigation to the Standard 62 debate and the Turkish practice examined in section V, is a test of how much weight that form can bear.

Dana Gas showed what happens when the form is tested. In 2017 the Sharjah-based issuer sought to avoid redemption of US$700 million of mudarabah sukuk by arguing before the English High Court that its own instrument was not Shari’ah-compliant and was therefore unenforceable under UAE law. Leggatt J, assuming for the purpose of the preliminary issue that the UAE-law documents were invalid, held that the English-law purchase undertaking was valid and enforceable regardless. The market exhaled. But the lesson was uncomfortable. The sukuk survived because it had been drafted as a bond, with an English-law backstop insulating investors from the Islamic contract at its centre.

That lesson is now being reopened. AAOIFI’s proposed revision of Standard 62 would require genuine legal transfer of the underlying asset, moving the market from asset-based to asset-backed structures. The objections to it concern plumbing, not principle. Many sovereign assets cannot lawfully be transferred; rating agencies rate obligor risk rather than asset risk; and a rule applied unevenly across jurisdictions could fragment liquidity. Whichever way the standard settles, the point for an infrastructure sponsor is the same. Restructuring a sukuk is harder, slower and more expensive than restructuring a bond, and the difficulty grows with the sincerity of the structure.

Türkiye: The Case Study

Türkiye is instructive because it has both a mature legal framework and a persistent gap between that framework and infrastructure practice. The Capital Markets Law of 2012 and the Capital Markets Board’s Communiqué on Lease Certificates gave sukuk a domestic name, kira sertifikası, and a domestic issuance route. The Treasury issued its first lease certificate in 2012. Participation banks, as Islamic banks are known in Türkiye, issued TRY 588.9 billion of sukuk between 2013 and 2025 and now hold 8.4 per cent of banking-sector assets. That share falls short of the 15 per cent that the sector’s own strategy set as its 2025 target. Yet almost all of this is what the World Bank calls the indirect route: sovereign and bank sukuk backed by generic state or balance-sheet assets, with proceeds flowing to the general budget or to ordinary lending. Project-specific sukuk, in which the toll road or hospital itself is the underlying asset, remain rare. The reasons are those set out in section IV. Türkiye’s infrastructure pipeline is overwhelmingly greenfield, built on build–operate–transfer and availability-payment PPPs. A greenfield project carries the cost-of-carry problem that makes any capital-market instrument, sukuk or bond, less attractive than bank debt drawn down as construction proceeds.

The most prominent exception confirms the pattern.

The Konya Karatay Integrated Health Campus, an 838-bed city hospital developed by YDA Group under the Ministry of Health’s PPP programme, reached financial close in late 2015 on €265 million of 18-year debt against a total investment of €350 million. The IsDB provided €67.5 million alongside the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank, UniCredit Bank Austria and Siemens Bank, with Ziraat Bank acting as account bank and security agent. It was the IsDB’s first direct participation in a Turkish project financing and its first health PPP anywhere, and the first Turkish PPP to combine Shari’ah-compliant and conventional tranches under common terms. What deserves attention is the form the Islamic money took. It was not a sukuk. It was a multilateral loan tranche, structured as an Islamic facility and documented to sit pari passu with the conventional lenders under a common terms agreement. Islamic finance entered Turkish infrastructure through a development bank, not through the capital market, because the IsDB could absorb structuring complexity and construction risk that a certificate-holder could not. That choice reflects structural fit with the project, not any shortcoming in the standard. It is also the pattern this piece has been describing. Where the asset is not yet built, sukuk yields to Islamic project finance, and Islamic project finance depends on an anchor investor that is there for reasons other than yield.

A Rule for Practitioners

The comparison yields a simple rule, and it is not the one the market’s vocabulary suggests. Sukuk are not the Islamic version of a bond. They are a different allocation of risk that happens to be priced against bond curves, and that allocation suits some projects and not others. It suits brownfield or near-operational infrastructure: an airport terminal already earning fees, a hospital already receiving availability payments, a portfolio of toll roads with a revenue history. Here the asset exists, the lease is real, the Gulf and participation-bank investor base is within reach, and the ownership structure adds discipline rather than friction. A sovereign with such assets and a thin conventional curve should treat sukuk as a first instrument, not a diversification exercise.

It suits far less well the greenfield project financed from a standing start. The asset does not yet exist. The istisna layer imports construction risk into a certificate designed to hold a lease. The cost of carry penalises early drawdown. And if the project falters, the sukuk’s very sincerity, the degree to which the asset transfer is real, becomes the obstacle to restructuring it. For such projects the honest answer is bank-led Islamic project finance with a multilateral anchor, with Konya as the template, followed by a sukuk refinancing once the asset is built and earning. Between these lies the market’s actual centre of gravity: asset-based sovereign and bank sukuk that fund general budgets and balance sheets, and whose relationship to any specific piece of infrastructure is indirect. That is a legitimate use, but it should be named as such. Much writing on ‘sukuk for infrastructure’ describes this indirect route while implying the direct one. The Standard 62 debate will settle where the line sits between ownership in form and ownership in substance. Whatever AAOIFI decides, the practitioner’s question remains the same, and it is asked alongside the doctrinal one, not instead of it. What is the asset? Does it exist? Who bears the risk that it does not perform? What happens on the day the sponsor cannot pay? A sukuk answers those questions differently from a bond. Choosing between them means deciding which answers the project can live with.